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Abstract 
 
The events that occurred on September 11/ 2001 changed the meaning of terrorism for 
many Canadians and brought the fear and reality of terrorism to the forefront. Large scale acts 
of terrorism in Canada have been quite rare; however, the fear continues. One of the concerns 
about terrorism is that, aside from homegrown terrorism, it involves people thousands of miles 
away from different backgrounds, cultures, legal structures, and objectives. Terrorist activities 
based on Islamic fundamentalism have been escalating throughout the world since early 2000. 
Even with the lack of major terror acts in Canada, youth radicalization makes the issue a 
relevant one in Canadian society. Whether the fear is proportionate to the level of threat, if left 
unaddressed, terrorist activities could flourish and undermine the safety and perception of 
safety for all Canadians. Consequently, this major paper strives to identify and evaluate 
potential solutions to minimize the threat of homegrown terrorism and address the underlying 
causes and processes associated with youth radicalization.  
Terrorist attacks must be taken seriously in Canada. New approaches and policies are 
required to better understanding and effectively deal with radicalized individuals who are 
committed to engaging in acts of terrorism in Canada or against Canadians and Canadian 
interests abroad. Self-radicalized terrorists, in particular, share a unique typology that differs 
from other terrorists and, therefore, identifying their motives is very important. While some 
theorists believe the cause of terrorism is psychopathology, sociopathic, or mental illness, 
others argue that terrorism is the result of an identity crisis. With the use of social media and 
the internet, these individuals are disposed to further engage in their terrorist propaganda. To 
address this issue, the argument forwarded in this major paper is that there must be a shift 
from reactive approaches to more proactive approaches and strategies. This major paper 
concludes that both youth de-radicalization and countering of violent extremism in Canada are 
best addressed through a community collaboration approach.  
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Introduction 
Historical background 
Terrorism is defined as a form of political violence (Matusitz & Breen, 2011; Sloan, 
2006; Wittendorp, 2011), and radicalization to violence and mobilization to engage in 
terrorist activities are complex processes. On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked and 
flew four airplanes into landmark American buildings, including the World Trade Centre 
(Hoffman, 2014). Throughout the next two decades, the terror continued in Western 
countries, including the commuter rail bombings in Madrid in 2004, the suicide attacks in 
London in 2005, the plot to bring down multiple passenger planes on route to North 
America in 2006, the aborted suicide bombings in New York in 2009, and, more recently 
attacks in Paris in 2015, Brussels and Berlin in 2016, Stockholm, and the United States to just 
name a few (Hoffman, 2014). 
With the rise of new radical Islamic terror groups after 9/11 and a resurgence of far 
right-wing ideological hate groups, there is a growing concern regarding the number of 
Canadians who are embracing terrorist ideologies and activities (McCoy & Knight, 2015), 
exemplified by the actions of John Nuttall and Amanda Korody in British Columbia (R v. 
Nuttall, 2016), as well as the terror attacks in Montreal and on Parliament Hill. In 2014, a 
homegrown terrorist engaged in a suspected suicide mission, entering the nation’s 
Parliament and murdering a Canadian Armed Forces reservist in the process (McCoy & 
Knight, 2015). In 2017, in Edmonton, Alberta, there was a terrorist attack that involved a 
stabbing and vehicle-ramming attack that killed police constable Mike Chernyk by Abdulahi 
Sharif, a man who had pledged allegiance to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Syria). In this 
attack, four pedestrians were also hit with a rental truck during a police chase (Toronto Sun, 
2017).  
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As a result of the actions by Islamic terrorist groups, Muslim communities have been 
subjected to acts of terrorism and violence. For example, in January 2017, six Muslims were 
killed in a shooting at a Quebec City mosque by Alexandre Bissonnette, a 23 years old 
student at Université Laval who had far-right, white nationalist, and anti-Muslim views. 
Bissonnette did not belong to any terrorist group; however, his hatred towards Muslims 
could be the result of Islamophobia or a fear or hatred of Muslims, in part as a response to 
what some Islamic terror groups have done. As Islamic radicalization and Islamic extremism 
continues to grow so does the number of Islamophobia incidents by white-nationalists. 
Given this, there is a level of fear about terrorist attacks among Canadians that has 
increased in recent years as a result of jihadist movements, such as ISIS, and right-wing 
ideological racist groups, including those with Islamophobic ideologies (Hoffman, 2014). 
One of the greatest challenges in preventing Islamic terror attacks is preventing 
transnational communication, while ensuring proactive international collaboration and 
consistent protocols exist (Olson et al., 2005). This is because one of the fundamental 
aspects of radicalization is recruitment and information sharing among radicalized members 
to people throughout the world. If it were possible to stop communication between 
individuals in a country with terrorist groups, regardless of where they are found, it would 
be much easier to prevent and reduce the number of terror attacks. Not only does 
transnational communication help recruit new members to terror groups, but also increases 
the ability of these groups to plan and fund their terror activities, and to spread their 
message. 
The rising threat of violent extremism has corresponded with the number of terror 
attacks, the proliferation of literature on radicalization, the acceptance of violent extremism 
by many young people throughout the world, and, to a lesser extent, the methods and 
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strategies used by Western governments to combat it (Bonokoski, 2017 & Chin, 2015). As 
radicalization has appeared to be increasing in recent years, Canadian officials should be 
aware of the risk that homegrown terrorism poses to Canada, especially given the research 
suggesting that the planning cycle of self-directed extremists is becoming increasingly 
shorter, and subsequently more difficult to foil by law enforcement and intelligent service 
(Toronto Sun, 2017). Individuals who are willing to act alone and are characterized as being 
self-radicalized do not share a typical profile, and their experiences and motives are 
remarkably distinct, which makes them difficult to identify and stop. In fact, the course of an 
individual’s radicalization or mobilization can start, slow, accelerate, or even stop based on a 
multitude of factors (Altier, Boyle, & Neil, 2017)  
The ideology of Islamic extremism is the constant variable in the equation of youth 
radicalization and homegrown terrorism, while recognizing that this is not the only group of 
people engaged in terrorism and radicalization. As mentioned above, the effects of right-
wing extremism on local and national youth radicalization cannot be neglected. However, 
while there are many groups that get classified as Islamic extremists or Islamic terror 
groups, it is important to keep in mind that these groups do not all share a single ideology or 
organizational/command structure (Shahzad, 2014). In fact, the various structures that 
these groups can take in Canada and abroad make it extremely difficult for law enforcement 
and intelligence officials in Canada to counter or infiltrate while ensuring that their activities 
respect the rule of law, the legal requirements of fair procedure, and the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. 
With the extensive manipulation of Islam through social media, terror groups like 
ISIS and al-Qaeda have successfully radicalized and recruited young foreign fighters from 
around the globe and has implored extremists to attack Western targets (Bell, 2014). Since 
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2014, numerous terrorist attacks have taken place in Europe and U.S. by al-Qaeda and ISIS, 
which, in addition to taking a toll in terms of direct and indirect victims, has exacerbated the 
anxiety and fear among citizens in these countries (Moghaddam, 2006). The key question 
posed in this major paper is, given the chance for further terror attacks in Canada, what kind 
of preventative approaches are more practicable to respond specifically to Islamic 
extremism ideology and youth radicalization. 
This major paper will identify the issue of homegrown terrorism among Canadian 
Muslim youth and will focus on identifying the main theoretical explanations for why and 
how Western Muslim youth are radicalized and join extremist groups. Several theoretical 
explanations for involvement in terror organizations, such as relative deprivation, social 
movement theory, and psychological perspectives, will be explored, in terms of their 
explanatory value in understanding the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism. 
Although radicalization discourse can create a false and stigmatizing equivalence 
between Muslims and terrorism, the fact that youth in Western countries have been 
radicalized to join terrorist groups, such as ISIS, requires much greater scrutiny, 
understanding, and action by Canadian officials (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2016). This 
major paper aims to identify some of the obstacles faced by the Canadian officials in 
identifying, preventing, and responding to those youth at-risk of violent extremism and 
those who have been radicalized. Also, this major paper will outline a possible framework 
for Canada to expand its Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) program and implement a three-
pronged program focusing on counter-radicalization, de-radicalization, and reintegration at 
the local government level, with a focus on youth and the preventive diagnosis of 
radicalization symptoms. This major paper will highlight the contributions of educational or 
societal withdrawal, lifestyle changes, supporting and perpetrating vandalism or violence on 
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behalf of an ideology, actively seeking new authority figures, demonstrating commitment to 
a new ideological community and its mission, and acquiring practical training in the use of 
firearms to the radicalization of youth (Klausen, Campion, Needle, Nguyen & Libretti, 2016). 
Homegrown terrorism is a serious problem for a very small minority of Muslims in 
the United States and Canada (Schanzer et al., 2010). Weine (2012) argued that “building 
community resilience is a matter of sustaining and strengthening protective resources in all 
areas of the community through increasing protection for adolescents and young adults, 
increasing awareness of parents, and developing community strategies to address 
threats”(p.66). While some theorize that the process leading to terrorism is due to 
psychopathology, sociopathic, or mental illness (Post, 1990), other researchers view 
radicalization as a by-product of group identity or social interactions and processes (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986) or as part of a ‘collective identity crisis’ in the Islamic world (Moghaddam, 
2006).   
The Definition of Radicalization and Islamic Extremism 
Borum (2011) defined radicalization as the process by which people come to support 
terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. However, there is 
not an agreed upon definition of radicalization. The research suggests that the process of 
radicalization is based on cultural cleavages, socioeconomic and personal factors, such as 
the shock of a life changing event, and the influence of a mentor (Vidino, 2010). Studying 
radicalization, in particular, the ideology and beliefs of individuals, is highly complex; 
however, there is a growing consensus that the radicalizing factors of youth are rooted in 
socio-economic factors or the lack of social and cultural integration, a lack of economic 
opportunity, and a lack of employment. When hope and opportunity are eclipsed, 
extremism will often feed off of the resulting despair (Borum, 2011). 
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Danish Security and Intelligence Service (DSIS) focuses on “violent radicalization,” 
and define it as “a process by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of 
undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific 
political/ideological objective” (Edwards, 2015, P. 102). The FBI, on the other hand, defines 
radicalization as a process by which an individual can become to believe their engagement 
in or their facilitation in non-state violence to achieve social and political change is 
necessary and justified (FBI, 2014). McCauley & Moskalenko (2008) identified radicalization 
as a movement of “beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify 
intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group” (P. 415).  
The study of radicalization is highly debated, which leaves it somewhat open to 
interpretation and misunderstanding. The term radicalization has been applied to groups or 
populations perceived as politically marginal or ideologically threatening (Vidino, 2010), but, 
as Bartlett and Miller (2012) have argued, radicalization can be non-violent or violent in 
nature. Taking the definitions presented above, this major paper will use the following to 
define radicalization. Radicalization is the process where individuals, particularly those who 
are rooted in undesirable socio-economic factors, such as having a lack of social and cultural 
integration or have a lack of fair economic opportunities, come to support, engage, and 
participate in undemocratic, violent, and morally unjust behavior to achieve a specific 
political or ideological objective.  
Islamism is an ideology that imposes conformity with Sharia law. Sharia law is the 
Islamic religious law forming part of the Islamic tradition. It is derived from the religious 
precepts of Islam, particularly the Quran and the Hadith. Islamism views violence as an 
acceptable means to establishing, maintaining, and following Sharia law. Under an Islamic 
radicalized interpretation of Sharia law, the use of violence is acceptable when violence is 
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seen as the only means to reach the objective of establishing Sharia Law (Jordan & Boix, 
2004). When considered with the general aim of reordering and structuring society in 
accordance with Islamic law, violent struggle can be viewed as a necessary element to 
eradicate obstacles to restoring God’s rule on Earth and defending the Muslim community 
against infidels and apostates (BBC, 2014). It is with this understanding that, for example, 
the British government defined Islamic radicalization as any form of Islam that opposes 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs (Borum, 2011).  
As for this major paper, the related terms of Islamist extremism, Islamic 
radicalization, and Islamism refer to a tendency or an acceptance of violence to reorder a 
government and society in accordance with Islamic law, a rejection of Western influences, 
and the transformation of faith into ideology to push people from different cultural, social 
and economic backgrounds towards extremist forms of Islam. For example, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, 
and Boko Haram are well-known extremist Islamic groups that have emerged in regions 
characterized by a history of exploitation, poverty, poor governance, and marginalization. 
In effect, radicalization is a process by which a person accepts the use of 
undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, as a legitimate and acceptable way to 
achieve or influence a specific ideological objective (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Borum, 
2011). Therefore, youth radicalization and Islamic radicalism are linked by the process of 
forming an extremist view that has a high propensity to encourage violent attitudes or 
violent action. 
What is Youth Radicalization?  
Youth radicalization can be defined as a “series of changes in beliefs, feelings, and 
behaviors that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of 
 
 
14 
 
the in-group” (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, P 420). Research shows that recruitment into 
gangs and recruitment into terrorism is similar (Malcolm, 2016). There are similar methods 
and motives towards joining extremist groups. With respect to Islamic radicalization, youth 
who are mostly the second generation of Middle Eastern immigrants can be frustrated by 
insufficient and less-quality programs and services that are offered in their community, 
making them easier targets for extremist narrators and YouTube videos that promote the 
benefits of joining and participating in terrorist activities. 
 Radicalization is a process of transformation based on particular social-psychological 
developments (King &Tylor, 2011), and is the process of forming an extremist view that has 
a high propensity to result in violent attitudes or violent action This can be driven by a wide 
range of socio-economic factors, such as income inequality, poverty, state instability, 
unemployment, lack of political participation, lack of education, state-citizen distrust, social 
marginalization, social media, cultural cleavages, discrimination, and a range of personal 
factors, such as low self-esteem , psychological factors, influence of a mentor, life changing 
events, and religious fundamentalism (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). The focus on youth is 
because people in this age range are most likely to be susceptible to the teaching of a 
charismatic leader, teacher, or mentor, and experience the aforementioned variables most 
acutely (Clare, 2011). Radicalization may not necessarily lead to violence, but is one of 
several risk factors required for someone to engage in an act of terrorism.  
Radicalization trajectories have been understood as deriving primarily from a 
personal crisis, traumatic events, and disillusionment. These elements have been found in 
over 90% of cases in the first part of the radicalization trajectory described as “pre-
radicalization” (Klausen et al., 2016). A dogmatic interpretation of Islam and a degree of 
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sectarian hate serve to transform the “pre-radicalization” youth into the next stage, which is 
referred to as “self-identification”, “indoctrination”, or “jihadization” (Klausen et al., 2016).  
Historical, sociological, and psychological factors play a critical role in this process. 
Group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, and personality characteristics are three 
psychological factors that have emerged from the research as key contributors to 
radicalization (King& Taylor, 2011). Radicalization has been defined as a psycho-social 
process of gradual progress from context to thought to action (Özerdem & Podder, 2011). 
Youth unemployment, underemployment, unequal access to education and skills, and a lack 
of socialization or integration into the macro-society or culture are some of the factors that 
lead to youth disconnection and can serve as motivators for radicalization among some 
young people. 
Social identity theory is Henri Tajfel’s (1986) greatest contribution to psychology.  
Social identity is a person’s sense of who they are based on their group membership. Social 
Identity Theory explains why some youth radicalize and can inform an effective paradigm 
for the de-radicalization of young people. Social Identity Theory asserts that youth seek 
belonging within a group, which comprises their identity and worldview. In some cases of 
radicalization, “young men turn to extremism in their search for identity acceptance and 
purpose which they are unable to find in the community more often concerned with wealth 
accumulation rather than healthy relationship-building” (Bizina & Gray, 2014, P.600). 
Creating this belonging may have the power to inform an identity that is resilient to the false 
promises that radicalization may hold (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The social construction of this 
belonging requires an in-group and an out-group. Essentially, different groups within society 
divide between an “us versus them” mentality, where group members of an in-group will 
seek to find negative aspects of an out-group, thus enhancing their self-image (McLeod, 
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2008). This can lead to or escalate conflicts between groups. This type of social framing can 
lead to issues like racism, extreme beliefs about an opposing group, or discrimination 
(McLeod, 2008). 
To understand youth radicalization requires both an individual and a societal or 
cultural examination of context-specific variables. For example, youth who experience 
religious or social discrimination may be pushed toward a more conservative and less 
tolerant type of Islamic practice, which might make them more susceptible to radicalization 
(Abbas, 2012). Experts argue that growing mistrust and negative opinion about their 
government’s foreign policy is a major driver for Western youth to become more radicalized 
and join ISIS and other terrorist groups. Where there is a negative perception, especially in 
the Muslim community, about the lack of access to educational facilities and other social 
resources, youth may experience relative deprivation, which, in turn, might cause 
radicalization (LaFree, Gary, Smarick & Fishman, 2010). Inequality theory is an extension of 
relative deprivation theory arguing that the blend of economic inequality and the issue of 
race increases one’s feelings of injustice. Negative consequences of inequality, such as 
alienation, frustration, and crime can contribute to radicalization (Gurr, 1970).  
There is some common understanding among government officials, policymakers, 
practitioners, and academics that there are both a number of situational variables and 
ideological factors that contribute to increasing the risk of terrorism (Francis, 2012). 
Marginalization, poverty, and modernity are frequently used as examples of situational 
variables that contribute to terrorism. It is clear, when considering the principles and views 
of Islamists that the internet, urbanization, and western culture has had a marginalizing 
effect on Muslims, leaving a large segment of the population and groups of people isolated 
in sub-cultures that do not connect to the macro-cultures of the countries these people find 
 
 
17 
 
themselves in. As mentioned above, this situation increases the divide between “us” and 
“them”, which has a negative effect on social identity and can contribute to radicalization.    
In addition, Islamic radicalization can emerge from religious and political currents 
within Muslim communities (Sageman, 2013). Research among refugee and immigrant 
families from African and other countries indicated the importance of numerous factors, 
such as family solidarity, transnational family, parent-child communication, parental 
monitoring and supervision, and parental school involvement as playing a role in putting 
youth at risk for radicalization (McGoldrik, Giordanoa, & Garcia-Petro, 2005). However, 
while these variables do appear to play a role in the radicalization of some Muslim youth, it 
is important to recognize that these factors could be generalized to all youth, regardless of 
their religion background or residency status. 
Radicalization and mobilization are distinct, but often intertwined processes (Crone, 
2016). Radicalization is a highly individualized process through which a person becomes 
convinced that violence is a legitimate, and eventually individually obligated, means to 
advance their ideological cause or beliefs. According to Gartenstein and Gross (2009), there 
are six main processes that move a Muslim youth towards radicalization. These factors are 
(1) the adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam, (2) identifying with and accepting an 
ideologically rigid group of religious authorities, (3) adopting a hostile view toward the West 
as being irreconcilably opposed to Islam, (4) manifesting a low tolerance for perceived 
religious deviance, (5) attempting to impose one’s newly adopted religious beliefs on others, 
and (6) the expression of radical political views. 
The threat of terrorism is real and serves as a telltale sign that more should be done 
to understand the reasons and motivations why youth join terrorist groups. Understanding 
the underlying reasons of terrorism better would contribute to the development of a more 
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effective framework for ascertaining the main ‘vulnerability factors’ associated with 
radicalization and terrorism before the aforementioned vulnerabilities are exploited by 
those who embrace terrorism as an acceptable form of political and religious expression. 
Working toward a better understanding of the problem and building effective prevention 
strategies are essential for authorities and communities. 
Who is at the Risk of Radicalization?  
The generally accepted view of youth radicalization is that those most at risk are 
second and third-generation immigrants who are citizens of a western country simply 
because that is where they were born, but do not hold strong allegiances to that country 
(King & Taylor, 2011). In addition to a degree of social, economic, political, and religious 
isolation that they feel, the internet can play an important role in providing a surrogate 
community for disenfranchised youth and filling this void. Moreover, some youth are 
attracted to real or virtual violence, which can contribute to the success of the radicalization 
process. While not entirely endorsed by the academic and research community, there are 
studies that have demonstrated that youth who routinely view violence on the internet 
have a greater likelihood of similar aggressive and violent behavior (Escobar & Anderson, 
2008). Moreover, youth are highly susceptible to media representations of violence and 
habitual childhood exposure to media violence can increase the risk for engaging in 
violence. Given this, parents, schools, and the community have important roles to play in 
de-escalating the potential for violence through integrating youth better, being assertive in 
their opposition to violence, providing alternatives to engaging in violence, and improving 
interpersonal communication with youth. Supervision and control of a youth’s media use, 
and discussions about what the youth is viewing online are some obvious preventative 
approaches that can be taken with youth.  
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The theory of relative deprivation can apply to many Muslim youth because there is 
a perceived discrepancy in their value expectations and value capabilities that lead to social 
discontent. This perceived gap creates frustration that can lead to aggression (McLean & 
Fraser, 2009). Understanding the thinking and beliefs, as well as the narratives that 
ultimately result in a youth engaging in an act of terrorism is not always clear, and the 
motivations and drivers that fuels terrorist violence is even less clearly defined (Change 
Institute, 2008). Those who radicalize youth focus on a range of youth vulnerabilities that 
may be associated with social class, immigration status, criminal record, mental health, 
family life, or peer group (Wolfberg, 2012). 
 The process of radicalization and adoption of violent extremism is catalyzed by two 
factors that are known as “push” and “pull” factors. Push factors are forces that can alienate 
people or cause them to reject mainstream society, such as a lack of access to adequate 
education or gainful employment, and difficulty with social integration or perceived 
discrimination. A push factor frequently relates to a situation or an event that is present in 
the country from which a person migrates, and can take the form of some economic, 
political, environmental, or social issue. It is generally some issue that contributes to the 
youth identifying with those from their ‘homeland’ and a perspective that their ‘adopted’ 
country is at fault or have played some role in the issue. Again, social marginalization, 
government repression, or unemployment are examples of push circumstances that make a 
youth frustrated with their current lifestyle or the condition of their fellow Muslims in 
another country. Pull factors are described as appeals from terrorist networks or radicals, 
such as propaganda or trigger events, and attacks or assassinations against Muslim 
populations that draw persons to accept the extremist ideology. The sense of belonging, 
propaganda, trigger events, financial incentives, or the desire for adventure or glory can 
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serve as pull factors that make a violent extremist ideology more attractive to an individual 
and serves to draw them into a radical ideology (Mia et al., 2016). 
In addition to push and pull factors, there are three primary motivational factors that 
often lead to radicalization. Those motivational factors are young people looking for 
meaning, seeking to establish a bond or gaining recognition, and individuals who perceive 
an injustice inflicted upon themselves or other similarly situated persons (Heyman, Gordon, 
& Watson, 2009). Sageman (2008) identified a four-stage process of radicalization. The first 
stage is a sense of “moral outrage,” followed by a stage that interprets the outrage in a 
specific way that in the mind of the individual is an act challenging them to action. Stage 
three has an ideological appeal and resonates with the individual’s personal experience, and 
it is regarded as part of a larger war. The fourth stage is one in which individuals are 
essentially mobilized (recruited) via networks either online or face-to-face. 
In this way, socially isolated, disenchanted young men turn to extremism in their 
search for identity, acceptance, and purpose that they are unable to find otherwise (Bizina 
& Gray, 2014). Emotions, such as frustration, anger, rage, and alienation, are some of the 
factors that play into any and all of the aforementioned stages, and they serve as building 
blocks as the individual moves from one stage to the other. Moral outrages of perceived 
injustices against Muslims, such as the war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the public burning 
of the Quran, the perception that Muslims are discriminated against by Western countries, 
Islamophobia, and acts that insult Islam or he Prophet Mohammed are powerful igniters of 
moral outrage, and they conform to the indicators developed by Sageman.  
From a counter-terrorism policy perspective, the issue of radicalization by Islamic 
fundamentalist and extremist groups of second-generation Muslim youth born in Western 
countries has become a major concern (Wolfberg, 2012). A general tendency to struggle 
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with their identity as Muslims first and Western citizens second strengthens their sense of 
being an ‘other’ that is marginalized and socially isolated; all of which makes them 
susceptible to extremism and the call to global jihad (Bizina & Gray, 2014). 
It is important to understand that not all youth who are radicalized can be classified 
as brainwashed ‘victims’ of ‘radical’ groups’ whose extremist ideas serve as ‘cognitive 
openings’ to the world of terrorism (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Instead, it might be helpful to 
understand that some of these youth are willing members who seek out this lifestyle and 
contribute to online terrorist forums, create YouTube terrorist propaganda channels, hold 
Twitter accounts that spread terrorist propaganda, manage active Facebook profiles, and 
create online blogs advocating violent Islamist extremism (U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Congress, 2012). 
General Approaches Taken by UK and U.S. to Control Radicalization   
Jenkins (2001) argued that 84% of the designers and perpetrators of terrorist 
operations in the U.S. were born in that country or were its citizen, and 66% of them were 
Muslim (Homeland Security, 2012). As a result, de-radicalization strategies and appropriate 
measures should be adopted to address religious discrimination and anti-Muslimism as an 
important aspect of the fight against Islamic extremism and terrorism. In terms of 
combatting violent extremism, typically there are two forms; countering violent extremism, 
which focuses on prevention and mitigating the effects of those already radicalized to 
engage in violent extremism, while also attempting to minimize the number of individuals 
who join violent extremist groups (Ramakrishna, 2017), and de-radicalization, which is a 
remedial process of instigating a shift in the beliefs of the individual such that they 
disengage from a radical ideology (Mia et al., 2016). Current de-radicalization interventions 
involve attempts to prevent an individual from returning to violent extremism, rather than 
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preventing the radicalization process in the first instance (Mia, Gharaibeh, Jeffrey, & Deeb, 
2016). The UK government has created the Channel Program, as part of their Prevent 
strategy in response to increasing rates of radicalization (Gayle, 2016). The UK’s Channel 
Program focused on ensuring that vulnerable children or adults of any faith, ethnicity, or 
background receive support before their vulnerabilities are exploited by those that would 
want them to embrace terrorism” (Gayle, 2016).  
The UK Channel works by identifying individuals who are at risk, assessing the nature 
and extent of their risk, and then developing the most appropriate support plan for that 
individual (Channel Guidance, 2018). The support plans often a multi-agency approach, 
where agencies and organizations come together to help the individual which could include 
anything from providing the individual with adult mentorship, life or educational skills, 
housing support, and even drug/alcohol support (Channel Guidance, 2018). The main focus 
of the program is to focus on building strong and resilient individuals and communities 
(McDonough, 2011). Despite the concerns among Muslim communities about the integrity 
and trustworthiness of the Prevent program, the UK has attempted to include education in 
their de-radicalization strategy (Weine, 2012). 
To date, the U.S. government has drawn upon the UK’s Prevent strategy in 
developing Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs. CVE programs and many other 
policies are designed to prevent individuals and groups from radicalizing and mobilizing to 
commit violence. These programs tend to have three overall objectives. First, respond to the 
ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it. Second, 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate 
advice and support, and third, to work with sectors and institutions where there are 
increased risks of people being radicalized. These three aims are addressed by working 
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directly with at-risk communities, using the principles of community policing, and working 
with partners in other countries (Weine, 2012).  
The U.S. is a good country to study because they represent many of the strategies, 
programs, and policies that characterize community-based initiatives, partnering with 
religious leaders, working with various levels of government, and addressing the concerns of 
communities. The U.S. federal government has undertaken many initiatives to shift youth’s 
behavior away from violent activities and violent extremist groups. Disengagement is a 
strategy for the cessation of participating in extreme violent activities and countering 
radicalization and violent extremism. Widespread concerns about some Muslim diaspora 
communities in the U.S. are leading many to develop processes, models, strategies, and 
programs to counter the development of homegrown violent extremism (Hunter, Ryan & 
Henke, 2011). 
In the U.S., as a part of President Obama’s policy, the FBI devised and implemented 
many resilience strategies that formed the basis of three broad initiatives to securing 
cooperation in criminal investigations and intelligence-gathering (Haberfeld, King, & 
Lieberman, 2009). This included monitoring online communications as a means to 
intervening on online extremist forums and as a way to identify radical discussions and 
participants online to alert law enforcement officials about youth who were at the risk of 
radicalization. 
Regarding resilience-focused policies, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 
2011 began to convene community meetings in Muslim-American communities around the 
country. This was, in part, in response to the Obama Administration’s policy statement in 
August 2011 entitled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States that stated that ‘‘our best defenses against this threat are well informed and 
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equipped families, local communities, and institutions’’ (The White House, 2011). Local 
police departments in the U.S. have been applying some of these counterterrorism 
elements in their work in Muslim-American communities and incorporating these tactics 
into their community policing strategies (Coaffee & Rogers, 2008). Community policing 
combines a reactive approach to services with a proactive approach to problem-solving in 
which local citizens are seen as partners (Haberfeld et al., 2009). For example, officers have 
begun to engage with children and youth in more friendly manners in order to break some 
of the barriers that these individuals and their family members may have against police in 
the United States (Weine, 2012). The idea behind this is that if we can break barriers and 
create greater support and trust between at-risk youth or minority groups and with police, 
then we may be to prevent entry into radicalization.  
Countering Violent Extremism Approaches in Canada 
In Canada, the focused of countering violent extremism programs has been on those 
“who have not yet crossed the line into violent extremism or terrorist acts” (Chin, 2015). 
The numerous countering violent extremism programs represent the understanding that 
there is a need to counter radicalization, and policymakers have been increasingly 
concerned about this issue, triggering a number of government initiatives and programs 
(Upal, 2015). Government countering strategies seek to mitigate the factors that could lead 
to radicalization in a community and prevent the potential transition of young people to 
violent extremism (Mia, Gharaibeh, Jeffrey, & Deeb, 2016). 
Since youth largely radicalize for psychological and social reasons, Canada’s 
preventative and remedial measures must address the underlying issues that lead to 
radicalization and the adoption of violent measures in the first place. (Euer et al., 2014). The 
Ministry of Public Safety and the RCMP are leading these programs; however, their de-
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radicalization efforts have not adequately incorporated the community level relationships 
that is necessary. The formation of these countering approaches stem from government or 
police-based practices, rather than community based. This is problematic because without 
these community-based connections and supports some vulnerable youth may be missed 
and may continue to be recruited as foreign fighters or incited to commit domestic terror 
plots. 
 Canada’s formal efforts to counter violent extremism was initiated with the 
formation of the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSET) in 2002, with a 
mandate to enhance the capacity and intelligence-sharing among partners within provincial 
and municipal police departments (RCMP, 2014). Since most youth countering approaches 
are implemented to prevent violent extremism, youth preventive measures in Canada is 
best served through a community collaboration approach (Monaghan, 2014). With many 
youth getting drawn into radical ideologies and joining local and international groups, the 
Canadian response to the threat of radicalization has mostly been through government 
support, which it hopes would counter any offers, such as financial payments, offered by 
extremist groups (Kilford, 2014). The countering of violent extremism process takes a two-
pronged approach that includes the “de-radicalization of attitudes and beliefs” and “the 
disengagement from violent behaviour and the process of leaving violent groups and 
reintegrating into other social groups” and has often been viewed as the reverse process of 
radicalization (Porta & LaFree, 2012, p.10). 
With the aim of de-radicalizing youth, as an example, Canada established the Centre 
for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence program (CPRLV) in March 2015 in 
Montreal to serve the Montreal and Quebec areas as a non-profit organization (CPRLV, 
2016). Its approach included prevention and skills development, research, and psychological 
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intervention to provide resources through a 24/7 hotline and some additional online tools 
and guides, such as the behaviour barometer to recognize behaviour symptoms of 
radicalization leading to violence (CPRLV, 2016). This program is based on the foundation of 
community support, giving community members, including parents, teachers, and 
neighbors, the tools and resources to identify, support, and mentor at-risk individuals. 
ReDirect is another program in Canada established by Calgary Police Department as 
a “prevention and education program aimed at youth and young adults vulnerable to 
becoming radicalized before they develop extremist ideologies or intentions” (Calgary Police 
Department, 2016). Similar to CPRLV, ReDirect focuses on education and setting up an 
awareness hub to stop the youth radicalization process through prevention programs. This 
initiative program relies on confidential referrals and does not target any particular segment 
of society (Calgary Police Department, 2016). Since CPRLV and ReDirect are relatively new 
programs, the evaluation of their long-term effectiveness and success is not currently 
available; however, success is likely if the program continues to follow the principles of 
community support and engagement. 
Youth with the immigrant background can play an important role in assisting with 
those at risk for radicalization because they can serve as a role model and mentor for those 
having trouble balancing their cultural identity and their Canadian identity. The characters 
of second generation youth are very different from their parents’ identities (Lyons-Padilla et 
al., 2015). For example, second-generation Muslim youth often have very little connection, 
from a cultural or language standpoint, to their parents’ birth country (Lyons-Padilla et al., 
2015). However, second generation youth also feel somewhat left out and cannot always fit 
into the macro culture. They may feel like “outsiders” or be treated as such by others, which 
can lead to frustration and alienation, and ultimately radicalization.  
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The Role of Social Media 
Social media as a propaganda tool of extremism narratives has deviated perceptions 
of religion. For example, ISIS has been very successful at using social media platforms, such 
as Facebook and Twitter to identify vulnerable youth that are susceptible to their 
propaganda material and their extremist views. In response, parental scrutiny and screening 
of their children’s activities in cyberspace where Islamic extremist propaganda is highly 
active is a crucial early preventive step that parents can take, in addition to the 
responsibility of the owners of these social network platforms to ensure that extremist 
views, videos, and forums are taken down. 
The use of social media by violent extremists is often sophisticated in terms of their 
ability to manipulate at-risk youth. The main way in which Islamic extremists use social 
media are for propaganda, intimidation, recruitment, and fundraising (Awan, 2017). 
Radicalization is encouraged directly or indirectly on the Internet through extremist 
propaganda, Internet, social media, and bulletin boards. Terrorist groups, such as ISIS, 
routinely use the Internet and social media sites to spread their propaganda, share 
information, data mine, fundraise, communication, and recruitment (Awan, 2017). 
In the U.S. and Canada, most of the radical youth belong to a growing breed of 
young people who are very familiar and comfortable with social media. The lack of social 
integration, lack of economic participation, social isolation, exclusion, and being viewed as 
“second class citizen” have contributed to a growing sense of frustration that can facilitate a 
youth’s radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism online without any need for a 
potential recruit to travel abroad for instruction or education (U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Congress, 2012).  
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In effect, the very basic aspects of social media, such as its volume, speed, 
multimedia interactivity, horizontality, decentralization, cheapness, anonymity, and global 
audience offers clear advantages to extremist groups that may otherwise have stayed 
marginal (Awan, 2017). Despite efforts by Western governments to prevent youth from 
joining extremist groups, the internet and social media play a facilitating role in the 
radicalization processes, especially among youth (Awan, 2017). Internet and social media is 
an active vector for violent radicalization that facilitates the proliferation of violent 
extremist ideologies and continues to be used very effectively to recruit and radicalize 
young people (Kamall, 2015). 
Information Sharing 
Countering terrorism and violent extremism must target the sources of funding of 
these efforts and groups. In short, terrorist activity financing is the use of funds, property, or 
other services to encourage, plan, assist, recruit, or engage in acts of terrorism, where the 
primary motivation is not financial gain (OSCE, 2018). As Tufts University international 
business professor Ibrahim Warde pointed out in “The Price of Fear: The Truth Behind the 
Financial War on Terror”, in a culture that refuses to explore the social and political roots of 
non-state terrorism, money becomes a default ‘cause’, even though relatively little is 
required to conduct a terrorist attack, “and such amounts can easily bypass the formal 
banking system” (Cooper, 2008, p.178). 
FINTRAC (the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre) is a key component 
of Canada’s strategy with respect to deterring and detecting terrorist financing. In order to 
protect the integrity and security of Canada's financial transactions, FINTRAC carefully 
monitors financial transaction reports for hints of suspicious behavior. FINTRAC is part of 
the Egmont Group, a global network of like-minded financial analysis organizations, and 
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collaborates with these other organizations to monitor money laundering and terrorist 
funding on an international level. Other prominent Egmont Group members include the 
United States' Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (Fin CEN) and the UK's National Crime 
Agency (NCA). FINTRAC has contributed to the fight against terrorism and the prevention of 
radicalization recruitment by identifying and preventing suspicious transactions from known 
terrorist or criminal organizations to individuals in Canada. By eliminating financial 
transactions, it hinders the ability for these terrorist or radicalized groups to operate. In 
addition, there is a greater need for intelligence sharing among the multitude of institutions, 
actors, and stakeholders that are active in the provision of internal security in the areas of 
diagnosing and taking preventive measures (Remuss, 2010). In 2006, amendments to the act 
enabled FINTRAC to share even more such personal information with law enforcement and 
security agencies, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), and the Canada Border Services 
Agency (CBSA). 
Countering violent extremism should always be a top priority of the government. 
Doing so requires both security responses and measures to enhance collective efficacy and 
social cohesion (Gelber, 2018). Improved multijurisdictional communication, including 
shared databases, is a key concern with cross-jurisdictional offenses, such as terrorism, 
because the lack of information sharing limits the ability of counter-terrorism efforts 
(Matusitz & Breen, 2011; Malone, 2005). Jean-Paul Laborde, Executive Director of the 
Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, said that “terrorism was an international threat 
requiring a global response” (United Nations Security Council Meeting, 2016). Although this 
is focused on global terror as a whole, it is related to radicalization as radicalization is the 
starting point of a terror threat. Since radicalization can snowball into a major terror issue, it 
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is important to be able to identify potential cases of youth radicalization when investigating 
or responding to global terror threats.  
One proposed solution is a shared database that would provide ongoing, current 
information that countries could use to fight terrorism (Olsen et al., 2005; Malone, 2005). 
Fighting crime and terrorism is a collective endeavor, and intelligence work is only a part of 
it. The contribution of financial intelligence to this fight continues to increase rapidly, with 
FINTRAC at the core of this effort. In 2010, Public Safety Canada (PSC), with collaboration 
from 18 government departments and agencies, initiated the Combating Violent Extremism 
Working Group (CVEWG) with the objective of “information exchange and collaboration” to 
prevent violent extremism (Monaghan, 2014). 
Mobilization is the process by which a radicalized individual moves from an extremist 
intent to preparatory steps to engage in terrorist activity, such as an attack, travel for 
extremist purposes, or facilitating the terrorist activity of someone else (Cooper, 2008). 
FINTRAC's mandate was expanded in December 2001 to provide the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS) with information on terrorist financing that threaten the security 
of Canada. In light of terrorist attacks in Canada, with collaboration of Fintrac, CSIS has 
updated and enhanced its analysis of the process of mobilization to terrorist activities by 
identifying, preventing, and eliminating financial transactions, it hinders the ability for these 
terrorist or radicalized groups to mobilize and perpetrate terrorist activities (Gill, Horgan, 
Corner & Silver, 2016).  
  Many extremist mobilizers demonstrate signs of observable “leakage”, which are 
the detectable range of activities and behaviours that individuals who are mobilizing display 
to those around them (Basra, Neumann & Brunner, 2016). These activities are often 
unavoidable in the course of planning a terrorist attack. Information sharing between law 
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enforcement and the community can help identify these leakages and provide information 
to prevent violence or other extremist activities and can assist in the development of 
effective intervention strategies.  
Sharing experiences, resources, and knowledge will aid in the development of 
responses by bringing all the intelligence agencies, police, and law enforcement together for 
a common purpose of countering terrorism and youth radicalization (Malone, 2005). This 
partnership would aid in facilitating communication and provide a sense of shared purpose. 
Combined responses will also assist them in learning how best to respond, develop shared 
strategies, and create best practices. For it to be effective, it must be a multi-agency, multi-
department, and multi-government collaboration that includes everyone from the top 
government officials, financial institutions, to the police and even community members, 
such as parents, neighbors and religious leaders. Information should also flow both top-
down and bottom-up, as this ensures no information is missed or deemed too minor. 
However, the challenges to this seemingly simple solution are many, including funding for 
such an undertaking, leadership and ownership of the program, privacy concerns, and 
jurisdictional concerns. Government must ensure that legislation is in place that helps 
minimize such challenges, such as allowing information sharing to occur under the name of 
national security.  
Information sharing and collaboration between police, security agencies, and 
moderate religious leaders is also necessary. Most of the religious leaders have the 
responsibility to report any suspicious activity or imminent danger, but this should work 
both ways; police, specifically community police officers, in Canada should also notify a 
trusted person from the religious group if they become aware of an at-risk youth. This needs 
to be done is a manner that does not jeopardize any security investigations, thus it is very 
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important to make sure the relationship between community police and religious leaders is 
very good. The expectation is that moderate religious leaders would then engage in a 
dialogue with the at-risk youth, provide religious guidance, correct misperceptions of 
religious teachings and text, or simply provide a safe space for the youth to express his or 
her worldviews. Although these leaders may not be able to determine the root cause or 
what the underlying factors that have caused a youth to become at-risk, the idea here is 
that the religious leaders will provide the youth with more accurate information and 
guidance about the religion in order to cancel any false beliefs of the religion the youth may 
hold.  
Terrorists have big imaginations in coming up with new ideas for achieving their 
ends, which means that indicators that are important today may not be important 
tomorrow. They are always finding new and innovative ways of carrying out their attacks; 
therefore, there is a need to evolve and continuously refine all intelligence agencies, police, 
and law enforcement in the way they view terrorists. Indeed, collection and information 
sharing or intelligence respecting activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected 
of constituting threats to the security of Canada should be undertaken on an ongoing basis. 
If Canada wants to be ahead of the game, they must continue to use the same amount of 
imagination that terrorists use when planning their attacks.  
As there are little direct community-based programs for countering youth violent 
extremism in Canada, community groups have taken it upon themselves to educate the 
public, provide social services, and liaise with government agencies (Jacoby, 2016). 
However, the RCMP does currently have a program known as the Integrated National 
Security Enforcement Team (INSET) which runs in four major cities (Vancouver, Toronto, 
Ottawa, and Montreal) that is used to help increase the capacity of collection, sharing, and 
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analysis of national security intelligence and to enhance their investigative capabilities by 
bringing more resources together (RCMP, 2018). The program is a collaborative effort 
between the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, and municipal police services.  
Continuing research and analysis into antecedent behaviours related to terrorist 
activities to better inform investigations, partner agencies, the government, and the public 
on current and emerging trends is paramount. One of the most important policies to 
develop and apply is that information sharing between agencies and the various strategic 
and tactical units attempting to prevent these acts. Sharing knowledge about precursor 
events, radicalization efforts, methods and means employed to execute the attacks, and all 
other information that may shed light on the potential for further attacks must be shared in 
a timely fashion. A major move toward this end is enhancing of the program management 
system for information sharing seeks to work with federal, provincial, local, and/or 
international partners to make relevant information available to decision makers (Wormeli, 
2014). Currently, many legislative and policy issues, such as privacy laws, hinder the ability 
of agencies to share information. With better legislation and laws in the name of national 
security, even better and smoother information sharing systems and processes can be 
developed and implemented. 
Education 
Youth today are tomorrow’s adults. They hold the key to future success. They have 
an active role and contribution to make to society. Denying them such an opportunity by 
not providing them access and resources to education and employments can negatively 
affect their future. This leaves them disconnected, deprived, and vulnerable to negative 
influences, and potentially vulnerable to radicalization. The assumption is that through 
higher education will come greater understanding and empathy if accompanied by positive, 
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prosocial interactions with the community and fostering an individuals’ sense of belonging. 
In addition to focusing on those at risk, educating the macro culture about different cultures 
and ways to deal with each other can promote harmony and trust within the community 
and reduce some of the variables associated with youth radicalization. Regarding the 
countering violent extremism programs, scholars emphasize reintegration, education, and 
community support following disengagement to maximize the success of such programs 
(Porta & Lafree, 2012).  
Providing realistic alternatives and future prospects outside of the violent extremist 
group also increases the prospect for disengagement and can reduce the likelihood of 
recidivism (University of Amsterdam, 2013). Adding a critical thinking component to 
Canadian schools can give youth a foundation to question and be curious about their 
surroundings, their culture, and the messages presented to them in the media and online.  
Another important avenue is to educate Canadians regarding the genuine threat of 
terrorism. Recent experience and media attention on terrorist activities may serve to 
increase the perception that the terrorist threat is more imminent or widespread than it 
actually is (Wittendorp, 2016). Through education, Canadians may become less fearful of 
the terrorist threat and more proactive in being tolerant of different belief systems and 
cultures. Though there are many potentially positive outcomes of improved education, 
including less hostility and a greater sense of safety, education alone is insufficient to 
change the perceptions of everyone. 
 Education is only one facet of the counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization, and 
counter-extremism response. There would be many challenges as people can become very 
entrenched in their belief systems and trying to change those beliefs from the outside could 
prove difficult. The overarching goal should be to provide the knowledge and skills for how 
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to address and prevent the conditions that contribute to a youth’s radicalization process as 
quickly and effectively as possible. The process starts from very basic levels; family, friends, 
peers, schools, and community. When a youth is given support, encouragement, and 
motivation to excel within his or her community, he or she will have a stronger connection 
to that community, which results to a better overall enjoyment of life. When a youth feels a 
connection to their community, they are more likely to continue schooling, find work, and 
have positive social bonds; all elements that serve as a counter-balance to radicalization.  
One way that this could be accomplished is by supporting at risk and identified youth 
through countering violent extremism programs that contain a strong educational 
component that focuses on developing critical thinking, problem-solving capabilities, 
confidence, and self-esteem. This is supported by the work of Veencamp and Zeiger (2015) 
who argued that the support of families coupled with a focus on educational institutions 
could build resiliency within communities. By teaching “critical thinking skills, civic 
education, community engagement and volunteerism in schools,” which could “help 
address the drivers of violent extremism in certain countries” (Veenkamp & Zeiger, 2015, 
p.155).  
Summary 
To achieve best practices in countering homegrown terrorism, there is a need to 
better understand the various forces that encourage youth to adopt violent extremism and 
the best means of combating these forces (Dugas & Kruglanski, 2014). More than 5,200 
people from Western Europe and North America have joined ISIS and other terror groups in 
Syria and Iraq; however, only 180 of those 5,200 travelers were Canadian (RCMP, 2018). It is 
also generally accepted that while only a small percentage of foreign fighters will ever 
return to their country of origin, the potential for these individuals to pose a threat upon 
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returning has been a concern for many governments, including Canada. Though the number 
of Canadian fighters joining groups like ISIS appears to be relatively small compared to other 
Western countries (Neumann, 2015), it has the potential to become a significant homeland 
security threat if it is not acknowledged, understood, and addressed. Moreover, this 
number does not include those who attempt to leave Canada to join extremist groups in the 
Middle East or elsewhere, but are prevented from leaving Canada. 
Scholarly discussion has largely focused on the process of radicalization and the 
various factors contributing to it. Visualizing individuals’ radicalization process from the 
initial formation of extremist sympathies to violent action is very important if we are to 
identify and respond to the precursory dynamic indicators of radicalization (Klausen et al., 
2016). Programs for countering violent extremism and de-radicalizing youth are also varied 
in approach. Some programs contain a clear focus on religion, while others focus on bringing 
together various segments of society, such as minority groups and the macro culture, to 
learn about each other (Ekici, 2015). 
Such programs need to build their programs based on local populations and local 
issues and concerns. As a result, the efforts of organizations, like the RCMP, which typically 
go into community with the intent to establish communication based on trust and 
tolerance, can be less effective if, for example, Muslims in that community see the police as 
a threat. In fact, building relationships between police and minorities could promote 
cooperation and maintain “effective communication and access to information” (Ekici, 2015, 
p. 184). As the primary responsibilities of the police are to build and maintain trust in the 
community, effectively doing so can facilitate a pathway to a de-radicalization process for at 
risk youth.  
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Mentoring, counseling, and offering financial, educational, and recreational facilities 
can also be an effective means to build up trust and encourage youth who are subjected to 
radicalization to cooperate. It is widely accepted by scholars that community policing with a 
focus on developing perceived community safety and trust between the police and public is 
an effective approach (Dunn, Atie, Kennedy, Jan, O’Reilly, and Rogerson, 2015). In fact, good 
governance, educational opportunities, employment opportunities, and hope for those who 
might otherwise be drawn into terrorist movements must stay at the heart of the fight 
against terrorism. Soft power measures are equally important, so that individuals who 
resonate to the calls of terrorists actually do find dignity, personal significance, opportunity 
and prosperity in their lives without believing they should resort to terrorist violence. These 
strategies can also be effective in addressing the issues of radicalization and mobilization to 
violence approach with the specific aim of addressing obstacles to countering radicalization.  
The process theory is also known as the “religious conveyor belt” theory as it cites 
Islamic mosques as “incubators” that cultivate the process of radicalization and relies 
primarily on religion as a driver (Williams, 2016). Practices based on this theory might 
arouse concerns over the civil rights violation and perceived as a contradicting with 
Canadian Charter of rights and Canadian human rights Act. Therefore, Canada and other 
Western countries must be cautious when implementing a de-radicalization program that 
focuses on ideology or religion, as they were presumably protectors of free speech and had 
to be “very careful not to include an ideological component to their work ” (Koehler, 2015, 
p.95). 
Establishing local intervention groups involving parents, police officers, government 
officials, trauma-informed counselors, youth activists, faith leaders, and violence-prevention 
experts who are committed to stemming the precursors of violent extremism, such as social 
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alienation, psychological disorders, political grievances, and Islamic extremist-inspired 
ideologies is critical. Having stakeholders from all segments of a community dedicated to 
public safety and preventing violent extremism can reduce homegrown radicalization by 
creating public awareness about the risk factors and empowering the appropriate figures to 
intervene with vulnerable individuals. The success of these intervention programs relies on a 
trusting relationship among these local groups, whereby persons who may be radicalized, 
regardless of the reason, are identified and intervened with. 
 The success of programs rely on adequate resources, an objective independant 
evaluation, and a trusting relationship, rather than judgment or stereotypes among local 
police, school counsellors, community services agencies, and faith leaders. The sharing of 
information between the groups and law enforcement or intelligence agencies is a 
necessary and effective tool for assessing potential terrorists and violent extremists. Using 
innovative methods, relying on community engagement, consent, trust, and confidence can 
be successful, rather than continuing to isolate youth and communities, maintaining a poor 
understanding of each other, and not building honest and meaningful relationships with 
targeted communities (Shahzad, 2014).  
In terms of public safety, individuals who are screened or identified at being at-risk 
by their parents, teachers, community members, or law enforcement may be referred to 
counselling, faith guidance, civic and political engagement programs, positive support 
networks, social housing, education, or health services. In cases where the intervention is 
unsuccessful or in cases with a youth may not want or refuses to participate, law 
enforcement, including intelligence agencies, must be notified to ensure the youth is 
effectively monitored. 
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Conclusion 
September 11, 2001 is a milestone in the history of modern-day terrorism. At that 
moment, the United States suddenly found itself in a war with unknown enemies armed 
with an extremist Islamic ideology. The underlying philosophy of Islamic terrorist groups, 
like al-Qaeda or ISIS, involves an ideological hatred of the West and its cultural dominance 
throughout the world, but particularly in Muslim countries. Using an extremist view of their 
religion and an interpretation of historical and current events that place them as the only 
and true defenders of their faith, extremists exploit poverty, social inequality, 
westernization, modernization, religious fundamentalism, and group and individual 
psychological factors to radicalize youth to terrorism (Ziemke, 2006). 
Both countering violent extremism and de-radicalization programs in the West 
appear to be formulated with a good understanding of the radicalization process and the 
risk factors associated with mobilization to violence. Some of these programs focus, almost 
exclusively, on the religious or ethnic factors that can contribute to radicalization, but fail to 
address other social factors that may affect youth (Gayle, 2016). Moreover, many programs 
focused exclusively on Muslim youth, to their detriment. To be most effective, de-
radicalization approaches should focus on all “fragile communities, not just Muslims” 
(Butler, 2015, p.20). 
From the social perspective, the attractiveness of terrorist groups to second and 
third-generation Muslim immigrants is rooted in their experiences of the social gap between 
their communities and the macro culture, social, political, economic, and religious 
marginalization, and, at times, a very rudimentary or misinformed understanding of Islam 
(Deardan, 2016). Moreover, as poverty and the lack of social mobility are factors that 
promote radicalization, a proactive approach to countering youth violent extremism must 
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include a focus on improving the socioeconomic condition of youth, primarily through 
educational and the development of genuine economic opportunities. 
Some of the limitations of these programs include the lack of meaningful 
consultations with effected or targeted communities and a general absence of focusing on 
building resiliency among youth. As a result, cases of extremism could worsen if root causes 
are not addressed. Moreover, regarding the importance of trust within communities, 
Canada’s formal de-radicalization programs are not necessarily better than informal 
community connections. A reason for this is that many extremists have a predisposed dislike 
of the current government and police, therefore, they are less receptive to government-led 
programs, whereas with community-based programs, a connection may be easier to be 
built. 
The research suggests that the process of radicalization from an initial exploration of 
extremist ideas to being mobilized to violence takes, on average, about five years (Klausen 
et al., 2016). This provides a significant amount of time for disengagement, de-
radicalization, and reintegration intervention programs and strategies to be used with an 
identified at-risk youth. Since youth largely radicalize as a result of psychological, social, or 
identity reasons, it follows that both preventative and remedial measures must address 
these issues (Chin, Gharaibeh, Woodham, & Deeb, 2016).  
Creating a typology of radicalized youth, linking these typologies to established 
theoretical models, and developing effective and targeted counter-strategies by the 
preventative approach of counter-radicalization is the key. De-radicalization and countering 
violent extremism programs must partner with the Muslim community and listen to their 
concerns and issues. Identifying youth who may be involved in radicalization or are at-risk of 
adopting extremist views would be more practical if their community’s leaders, faith 
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leaders, teachers, and families were legitimate stakeholders in the programs, contributed to 
the development of the interventions, and were meaningful partners in the process. The 
involvement of people from different ethnic backgrounds that represent the targeted group 
of youth is also important.  
Establishing a judgment-free environment in the such programs, utilizing intelligence 
agencies for early detection of terrorist behavior, and focusing on prevention as a critical 
component of a CVE’s strategy that is partnered with police, local governments, and NGOs 
designed to challenge radical Islamism through supporting individuals at-risk of 
radicalization and strengthening the capacities of communities to prevent radicalization and 
resolve grievances that violent extremist groups might exploit is also critical (Chin et al., 
2016). For example, in Canada, de-radicalization and countering violent extremism 
programs focus on community engagement, providing a safe space for youth, open 
dialogue, and investing in mental health and education. A focus on these issues can 
contribute to a youth’s successful integration in Canada and can create a positive sense of 
belonging and identity. 
To reduce the chances of radicalization and mobilization to violence among youth, 
Canada should consider proactive investments, on a much larger scale, focused on youth 
well-being. This could prevent vulnerable youth from being attracted to and joining violent 
extremist groups and can similarly reduce the chances of their involvement in gangs and 
other criminal activities. Canada can incorporate the lessons learned and to be learned from 
the UK and U.S., particularly with respect to the importance of building trustful relationships 
and networks between the public and those providing the service. 
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Recommendations 
The recommendations provided below serve as a platform for understanding and 
recognizing the problem of radicalization and tackling it at a strategic, tactical, and 
operational level. As discussed throughout this major paper, to address youth radicalization 
effectively requires a proactive approach that engages agencies of public safety and the 
community. However, the government should avoid adopting strict measures against youth 
within a community as this can feed Muslim community suspicions that the government 
cannot be trusted. For example, police should not engage in strict stereotyping or racist 
profiling, nor should they force community members to participate in Westernized 
practices. The government should be acting as a genuine partner interested in working with 
the community. Critically, the development and evaluation of new policies and interventions 
are necessary to build community resilience to violent extremism in Muslim diaspora 
communities in the U.S. and Canada.  
In terms of enhancing community safety, countering terrorism, and interrupting the 
various pathways that lead to youth radicalization, it is important to create a typology of 
radicalized youth, link these typologies to established theoretical models, and develop 
effective and targeted counter-strategies. This likely includes structured government-led 
programs in addition to supporting the role that mentors, parents, community leaders, 
religious leaders, and peer groups can play in deterring and preventing youth radicalization.   
Refugee and immigrant parents often face great difficulties in Canada resettlement, 
and often lack adequate social support or social services to help them and their children 
adjust to their new lives (Durden, 2016). One of the reasons already identified for the 
number of radicalized youth with a refugee background in the Western countries has been a 
conflict between maintaining their religious duty and obligation and conforming to Western 
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culture. For example, refugee youth may have strong ties with their religion and with 
religious leaders; however, they may encounter different, and often negative, viewpoints 
about Islam from the public. This could cause the youth to go one of two ways, either move 
away from their religious faith or move towards extremist. 
Youth, especially first generation youth, face a large number of cultural, economic, 
and political barriers, such as language, acculturation, assimilation, and social norms. As 
employment and education plays an important role in the level of community bond, it is 
important to understand that youth ages 16 to 24 years have lower levels of employment 
compared to those youth who have some college education or have already graduated with 
a degree (Enchautegui, 2014). Therefore, it is important to make sure opportunities are 
available for both work and education. Youth who feel a lack of belonging or connection to 
their community may feel compelled to seek out other likeminded youth, which can be 
found online. Recruiters to extremist groups are quite adept at finding these youths online 
and providing them with information and peer groups that encourage radicalization. Once a 
youth has made these kinds of connections and has begun down the pathway to 
radicalization, in order to disengage them from extremist views, peers, and social network, 
there is a need to provide them a viable and alternative identity and support network 
(Shepard, 2016). 
In order to combat the pull of radicals and extremist views on at-risk youth, a focus 
on families is necessary, as is a positive, prosocial connection with their community. Having 
positive community support increases the probability that a radicalized youth can be 
successfully re-integrating into their family and community (Hair, Moore, Ling, McPhee-
Baker, Brown, 2009). In effect, the family, the community, and other leaders can become 
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appropriate role models for youth, thus dissuading them from continuing down the pathway 
to radicalization and mobilization to violence. 
 Social Identity Theory suggests that if youth are not provided with the space to 
explore and discuss their ideas, their worldviews, and their cultural and religious identities, 
there are vast opportunities online that will present a radical or extremist view in support of 
the youth’s concerns or experiences. If youth are not given the opportunity to address 
different beliefs with their families, in their schools, or in the community, they may lose that 
sense of both self and of belonging to a certain group in a positive manner (Stets & Burke, 
2000). Implementing any such approach, therefore, needs to focus on developing 
opportunities for youth to discuss their feelings and experiences with experts from the 
community that can provide context or information that helps the youth develop a more 
positive and prosocial identity and worldview. Given this, it is critical that communities have 
the necessary mechanisms for early identification of youth who may be radicalizing toward 
violence and a means of providing off-ramps for these youth before the criminal justice 
system becomes engaged.  
It is clear that Islamic extremism has charismatic leaders and recruiters with the skills 
and organizational capacity to attract marginalized and isolated youth to their cause. With 
respect to Islamic radicalization, youth are being put on the path to violence at home and 
abroad by religious propaganda and online activities, sometimes through the local mosque. 
With a focus on the injustices suffered by Muslims at home and abroad, extremist narratives 
attempt to stir up a sense of hatred and revenge against the West from within Muslim 
communities.  
There are over 100 mosques and Islamic centers scattered across Canada (IRC, 
2018), and like in other Western countries, second only to social media, are the most 
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popular places for extremists to recruit young people who may be susceptible to 
fundamentalist and extremist rhetoric. The ideology of Islamic fundamentalism runs counter 
to the values of the Enlightenment and modernity. Some of its key features include a 
fervent opposition to women’s freedom, civil rights, religious freedom, and political 
pluralism with antagonism towards the arts and modern civilization. In many ways, these 
groups rely on violence and terror to reestablish a society that existed during the time of the 
Prophet Mohammed. To assist in achieving this, these groups use extremist rhetoric and the 
promise of salvation for those youth who kill and die on behalf of this ideal.   
Countering homegrown terrorism and youth radicalization is fraught with many 
challenges. As Canadians continue to demand security and safety within the contexts of 
individual rights and freedoms and privacy, the struggle against terrorism and Islamic 
Fundamentalism is very difficult. As Gelber (2018) proposed, greater policies should be 
enacted that address the indirect enablers of violent extremism, such as criminalizing the 
encouragement of terrorism which is already implemented in Canada, banning 
organizations that encourage or glorify terrorism, and banning the displaying of clothing or 
items that symbolize prohibited groups. One counter argument to this that it may go against 
individual’s Charter of Rights and Freedom; however, this still could happen if it is for 
national security and for preventing hatred of others. By further expanding on the current 
innovative and policies in place, we may be able to minimize the opportunities for some 
groups to induce others, including vulnerable youths, to commit acts of religiously 
motivated violence.  
 It is not acceptable to the Canadian government that religious and ethnic minorities 
living in Canada should refuse to integrate into a liberal democracy. As a Mosaic-type 
country, Canada actively encourages citizens to maintain their culture and beliefs, but 
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within the context of Canadian values. It certainly does not insist or encourage immigrants 
to abandon their values, culture, or beliefs, but rather contribute to the cultural richness of 
the country by combining their traditional values, beliefs, and practices with Canadian 
culture. In their view, minorities’ ethnic traditions must be respected and valued. As a 
result, this attitude can serve to improve relationships between communities, and provide 
avenues for immigrant youth to integrated more fully into Canada and reject the calls from 
extremists. 
Youth who are suffered from religious discrimination, isolation, and social 
inequalities are more likely to be attracted to the extremists’ propaganda and are more 
likely to be targeted by recruiters in the hopes that these youths will either join these 
groups or can be mobilized to violence on behalf of these groups and their ideologies. In 
accordance to Canadian countering violent extremism programs, it is crucial to educate 
youth on alternatives to these radical perspectives and to foster positive identities that 
support their ethnic and religious backgrounds, but reject fundamentalism and the use of 
violence to promote political or religious ideologies. When it comes to de-radicalizing youth 
who are already on that path, it is critical to replace a youth’s online social network, when it 
involves people or groups that espouse radical views with prosocial online and real-world 
peer groups (Shepard, 2016). 
The nature of terrorism has changed over the past decade. Terrorism used to require 
large amounts of money, advanced weapons, and the support of a government. Today, 
terrorism only requires a driver’s license, a small amount of case, and a heart full of hate. 
Nonetheless, we should remember not to neglect the threat posed by non-Islamic terrorism 
either. By only focusing exclusively on immigrants and Muslim communities, we limit the 
success of de-radicalization for all at-risk individuals. Non-Islamic terrorism does exist as 
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evident in the rise of non-Islamic terrorism committed by white citizens. For example, the 
case of Alexandre Bissonnette, a 27 year old who terrorized a Quebec community, or the 
case of terror suspect Aaron Driver of Strathroy, Ontario. (Canadian Press, 2017).  
Similar to other countries, Canada is not exempt from youth radicalization to 
terrorism. The literature confirms that Muslim youth who become radicalized do so for 
reasons, including a lack of education, economic hardship, and social isolation. Moreover, 
there is not a one-size-fits-all typology of the typical youth who is at risk for radicalization; 
some are attracted to the thrill and violence associated with this ideology, some are 
attention seekers, some suffer from mental illness, but some are well educated and come 
from middle-class families. It is clear that more research is needed to understand the 
relationship between youth identity, discrimination, social integration, and radicalism, and 
what are the most effective strategies and approaches to preventing and responding to 
Islamist-inspired terror attacks. 
  
 
  
 
 
48 
 
References 
 
Abbas, T. (2012). The symbiotic relationship between Islamophobia and radicalization. Critical 
Studies on Terrorism, 5, 345–358. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.723448 
Altier, M., & Boyle, E., & Shortland, N., & Horgan, J., (2017). “Why They Leave: An Analysis of 
Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-Seven Autobiographical Accounts,” Security 
Studies, 26:2 (2017) 305–332. 
A New Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Sharing Expertise and Empowering Local 
Communities. (2014). FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 1-7. Available from: Military & 
Government Collection, Ipswich, MA. Accessed January 16, 2018. 
Awan, I. (2017). Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media. Society, 54(2), 138-149. 
Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between 
              Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization. Terrorism & Political Violence, 24(1), 1. 
Basra, R., Neumann, P., and Brunner, C., (2016). Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European 
Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus (London: The International Centre for the Study 
of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2016). 
BBC, “What is Jihadism”, December 11, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east30411519. 
Bell, S. (2014). ISIS urges jihadists to attack Canadians: ‘you will not feel secure in your bedrooms.’ 
Retrieved from http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/isis-urges-jihadiststo-attack-
canadians-you-will-not-feel-secure-in-your-bedrooms. 
Bizina, M. & Gray, D. (2014). “Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counterterrorism 
 
 
49 
 
             Policy,” Global Security Studies 5, no. 1 (2014): 72. 
Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. (2016). From Theorizing Radicalization to Surveillance 
Practices: Muslims in the Cross Hairs of Scrutiny. Political Psychology, 37(5), 597-612. 
doi:10.1111/pops.12284 
Bonokoski, M. (2017). Ottawa battens down for Canada Day as ISIS threatens attack. Toronto Sun. 
Retrieved from http://www.torontosun.com/2017/06/28/ottawa-battens-down-for-canada-
day-as-isis-threats-again 
Borum, R. (2011). “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36. 
Butler, D., (2015). “Terrorism Science: 5 Insights into Jihad in Europe.” Nature, 528 (December 
2015): 20–21. doi: 10.1038/528020a. 
Cahill, d. (2017). The justice against sponsors of terrorism act: an infringement on executive power. 
Boston College Law Review, 58(5), 1699-1733. 
Channel Guidance, (2018). “Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism: 
Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels”. Retrieved 
fromhttps://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf) 
Calgary Police Department. (2016). Youth intervention. Retrieved July 15, 2016. Retrieved from 
http://www.calgary.ca/cps/Pages/Youth-programs-and-resources/Youthintervention/              
ReDirect.aspx 
 
 
50 
 
Canadian Press. (2017). A list of Canada’s terror incidents and attacks. Retrieved from 
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/10/01/a-list-of-canadas-terror-incidents-and-
attacks.html 
Change Institute. (2008). Studies into Violent Radicalization; Lot 2—The Beliefs Ideologies and 
Narratives (London: Change Institute, 2008). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/home 
affairs/doc_centre/terrorism/ docs/ radicalization study on ideology and narrative.pdf 
Chin, V. (2015). Collateral damage of counter-terrorism measures and the inevitable 
consequence of the social exclusion and marginalization of vulnerable groups. In Lombardi, 
M., et al. (Eds.) Countering radicalization and violent extremism among youth to 
             prevent terrorism. (pp. 11-22). Washington, DC: IOS Press 
Chin, M., Gharaibeh, S., Woodham, J., & Deeb, G. (2016). A national strategic framework for 
countering violent extremism in Jordan. Journal of International Affairs, (2), 115. 
Clare, R. (2011). “Relative Deprivation Theory in Terrorism: A Study of Higher Education and 
Unemployment as Predictors of Terrorism.” Master’s thesis, New York University. 
Coaffee, J., & Rogers, P. (2008). Rebordering the City for New Security Challenges: From Counter-
terrorism to Community Resilience. Space & Polity, 12(1), 101-118. doi: 
10.1080/13562570801969556 
Conway, M. (2003). What is cyber terrorism? The story so far. Journal of Information Warfare, 2(2), 
33–42 
Cooper, R. N. (2008). The Price of Fear: The Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror. Foreign  
affairs, 87(1), 178. 
 
 
51 
 
CPRLV. (2016c). Guides and tools. Retrieved July 15, 2016. Retrieved from https://info-
radical.org/en/totrain/ guides-and-tools. 
 Crone, M. (2016). “Radicalization revisited: violence, politics and the skills of the body,” 
International Affairs, 92:3 (2016) 587–604. 
Dawson, L. (2002) ‘Crises of charismatic legitimacy and violent behaviour in new religious 
movements ’, in D. Bromley and G. Melton (eds.), Cults, Religion and Violence (Cambridge, 
CUP). 
Deardan, L. (2016). “ISIS Documents Leak Reveals Profile of Average Militant as Young, Well-
educated but with Only ‘Basic’ Knowledge of Islamic Law,” Independent. Retrieved from 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-documents-leak-reveals-
profile-of-averagemilitant-as-young-well-educated-but-with-only-basic-a6995111.html. 
Dugas, M., Kruglanski, A., (2014). “The Quest for Significance Model of Radicalization: Implications 
for the Management of Terrorist Detainees," Behavioral Sciences. Sci. Law 32, (3): 423-39. 
Dunn, K., Atie, R., Kennedy, M., Jan, A., O’Reilly, J., and Rogerson, L., (2015). “Can You Use 
Community Policing for Counter Terrorism? Evidence from NSW, Australia,” Police Practice 
and Research, 1-16. 
Durden, T. (2016). “Obama Admits 10,000 Syrian Refugees: This is Where They Are Headed,” Zero 
Hedge, August 30, 2016. Retrieved fromhttp://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-08-
30/obama-admits-10000-syrianrefugees-ahead-schedule-may-put-them-work-detroit. 
Edwards, J., (2015) “Figuring Radicalization: Congressional Narratives of Homeland Security and 
American Muslim Communities,” Journal Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 12, 
no. 1 (2015):102–120. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2014.996168. 
 
 
52 
 
Ekici, S. (2015). Countering violent extremism among youth: The Turkish case. In M. Lombardi et al. 
(Eds.) Countering radicalization and violent extremism among youth to prevent terrorism. 
(pp. 171-182). Washington, DC: IOS Press 
Enchautegui, M. (2014). Immigrant Youth Outcomes Patterns by Generation and Race and Ethnicity. 
Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/immigrant-youthoutcomes-patterns-
generation-and-race-and-ethnicity. 
Euer, K., Krols, Y., Van Bouchaute, K., Groenen, A., Paoli, L., Hogeschool, T., & APART. (2014). “Part 
III: Conclusions and Recommendations," Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators and 
Response to Radicalisation, STRESAVIORA. September 2014, 13-19. 
Francis, M. (2012). “What Causes Radicalization? Main Lines of Consensus in Recent Research,” 
Radicalization Research, January 24, 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/guides/francis-2012-causes-2/. 
Gartenstein-Ross, D., Grossman, L. (2009). Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and UK: An Empirical 
Examination of the Radicalization Process (Washington, DC: FDD Center for Terrorism 
Research, 2009). Retrieved from 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/HomegrownTerrorists_USa
ndUK.pdf. 
Gayle, D. (2016). Prevent strategy 'could end up promoting extremism.' Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/21/government-prevent-trategypromoting-
extremism-maina-kiai 
Gelber, K. (2018). Incitement to Hatred and Countering Terrorism: Policy Confusion in the UK and 
Australia. Parliamentary Affairs, 71(1), 28-49. doi:10.1093/pa/gsx008 
 
 
53 
 
Gill, P., Horgan, J., Corner, E., and Silver, J. (2016) “Indicators of Lone Actor Violent Events: The 
Problems of Low Base Rates and Long Observational Periods,” Journal of Threat Assessment 
and Management, 3:3-4 (2016) 165–173. 
Gurr, T. (1970). “Why Men Rebel”. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970. 
Haberfeld, M.R., King, J.F., & Lieberman, C.A. (2009). Terrorism within comparative international 
context: The counter-terrorism response and preparedness. New York, NY: Springer 
Publishers. 
Hair, E., Moore, K., Ling, T., McPhee-Baker, C., Brown, B. (2009). Youth Who are ‘Disconnected’ and 
Those Who Then Reconnect: Assessing the Influence of Family (Publication No. 2009–37) 
(Bethesda, MD: Child Trends, 2009), Retrieved from 
http://www.childtrends.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/8.pdf. 
Hamilton, L. H., Hoffman, B., & Jenkins, B. M. (2008). Making the Grade: From A to F, how the U.S. 
measures up in its struggle against global extremism. National Interest, (94), 12-15. 
Heyman, D., Gordon, D., & Watson, T. (2009). Proceedings from Forum held October 15–17, 2008: 
Anticipating terrorist violence: Understanding hearts and minds. Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. 
Hoffman, B. (2015). A First Draft of the History of America’s Ongoing Wars on Terrorism. Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, 38, 75-83. 
Hunter, Ryan, & Henke, D. (2011). “Perspective Radicalization of Islamist Terrorists in the Western 
World.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2011. Retrieved from            
https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/perspective-radicalization-of-islamistterrorists-in-the-
western-world. 
 
 
54 
 
Interpol. (2015). History. Retrieved from http://www.interpol/int/About-Interpol/History.    
Interpol. (2016). Terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Terrorism. 
Islamic Relief Canada. (2018). Retrieved from http://islamicreliefcanada.org/mosque-list. 
Jacoby, T. A. (2016). How the war was ‘one’: Countering violent extremism and the social 
dimensions of counter-terrorism in Canada. Journal for De-radicalization, spring (6), 272-
304. 
Jenkins, B. M. (2001). Terrorism and Beyond: a 21st Century Perspective. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 24(5), 321-327. doi: 10.1080/105761001750434196 
Jordan, J., and Boix, L. (2004). “Al-Qaeda and Western Islam,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, 
no. 1: 1–17, doi 10.1080/09546550490445983. 
Kamall, S. (2015). “What Drives Young Muslims to Radicalization. Many Elders Understand We Can 
Both be European and Muslim. Now We Need to Teach Our Children How,” Wall Street 
Journal, February 5, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.wsj.com/articles/syed-kamall-what-
drives-young-muslims-to-radicalization1423169290 
Kilford, C. (2014). Kilford: Canada’s first de-radicalization program. Retrieved from 
http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/kilford-canadas-first-de-radicalization-program. 
King, M., & Taylor, D. M. (2011). The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of 
Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence. Terrorism & Political Violence, 23(4), 
602-622. 
Klausen, J., Campion, S., Needle, Nguyen, G., & Libretti, R., (2016) Toward a Behavioral Model of 
“Homegrown” Radicalization Trajectories, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 39:1, 67-83, doi: 
10.1080/1057610X.2015.1099995 
 
 
55 
 
Koehler, D. (2015). De-radicalization and disengagement programs as counter-terrorism and 
prevent tools. Insights from field experiences regarding German right-wing extremism and 
Jihadism. In M. Lombardi et al. (Eds.) Countering radicalization and violent extremism 
among youth to prevent terrorism. (pp. 120-150). Washington, DC: IOS Press 
LaFree, Gary, Smarick, K. & Fishman, S. (2010). Community-level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data 
and Measurement Workshop. Washington, DC: National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/community-level-indicatorsradicalization-
data-and-measurement-workshop. 
Lyons-Padilla, S., Gelfand, M.  Mirahmadi, H., Farooq, M., and Marieke van Egmond. “Belonging 
Nowhere: Marginalization and Radicalization Risk among Muslim Immigrants.” Behavioral 
Science & Policy 1, no. 2 (Winter2015): 1–12.  
Malcolm, J.A. (2016). Responding to international terrorism: The securitization of the United 
Kingdom’s ports. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18(2), 443-462. 
Malone, D. (2005). Terrorism: The United Nations and the Search for Shared Solutions.  Journal of 
Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, 10, lvii-lxiii. 
Matusitz, J. & Breen, G. (2011). A Solution-based Examination of Local, State, and National 
Government Groups Combating Terrorism and Cyberterrorism. Journal of Human Behavior 
in the Social Environment, 21, 109-129. 
McCauley, C., & Moskalenko, S. (2008). Mechanisms of political radicalization: Pathways toward 
terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 20, 415-433. Retrieved from 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546550802073367 
 
 
56 
 
McCoy, J. & Knight, W. (2015). Homegrown Terrorism in Canada:  Local Patterns, Global Trends. 
Studies in Conflict Terrorism, 38, 253-274. 
McDonough, D. (2011). Remarks at the Adams Center. Sterling, Virginia. March 8th. Retrieved from          
http://blog.dhs.gov/2011/03/video-deputy-national-securityadvisor.html 
McGoldrick, M., Giordano, J., & Garcia-Petro, N. (2005). Ethnicity & family therapy. New York, NY, 
and London: Guilford Press. 
McLean, L. & Fraser, E. (2009). Youth Exclusion, Violence, Conflict and fragile States. Birmingham, 
UK: Governance and Social Development Resource Center, 2009. Retrieved from 
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/con66.pdf. 
McLeod, S. A. (2008). Social Identity Theory. Retrieved from 
http://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html 
Mia, C., Gharaibeh, S., Jeffrey, W., & Deeb, G. (2016). A National Strategic Framework For 
Countering Violent Extremism In Jordan. Journal of International Affairs, 69(2), 115-132 
Mirahmadi, H.(2013). An Innovative Approach to Countering Violent Extremism.Improving the 
quality of U.S. Middle East policy. The washington Inistiute. Retrived from 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org (March 23, 2018) 
Moghaddam, F. M. (2006). From the terrorists’ point of view: What they experience and why they 
come to destroy. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. 
Monaghan, J. (2014). Security traps and discourses of radicalization: Examining surveillance 
practices targeting Muslims in Canada. Surveillance & Society, 12(4), 485-501. Retrieved 
from http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412950589.n909 
 
 
57 
 
Mueller, R. S. (2010). Statement before the Senate Committee in Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/nine-years-after-9-11-confronting-the-terrorist-threat-
to-the-u.s     
National Institute of Justice (2015). Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from 
Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. Arlington, VA: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2015. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249947.pdf. 
Neumann, P., (2015). "Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan 
conflict in the 1980s," ICSR, Department of War Studies, Kings College. January 26, 2015. 
Retrieved from http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-
surpassesafghanistan-conflict1980s. 
Olson, D., Leitheiser, A., Atchison, C., Larson, S., &Homzik, C. (2005). Public Health and Terrorism 
Preparedness: Cross-Border Issues. Public Health Reports, 120, 76-83. 
Özerdem, A., & Podder, S. (2011). Disarming youth combatants: Mitigating youth radicalization and 
violent extremism. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 63-80. Retrieved from 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1141&context=jss 
Porta, D. D., & Lafree, G. (2012). Guest editorial: Processes of radicalization and de-radicalization. 
International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 6(1), 4-10. 
Post, J. M. (2007). Collective identity: Hatred bred in the bone. Foreign Policy Agenda. Retrieved 
from Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Homeland 
Security Digital Library website. Retrieved from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=473999 
 
 
58 
 
Post, J. M., Ali, F., Henderson, S. W., Shanfield, S., Victoroff, J., & Weine, S. (2009). The Psychology 
of Suicide Terrorism. Psychiatry: Interpersonal & Biological Processes, 72(1), 13-31.R. v. 
Nuttall, 1404 (British Columbia Supreme Court, 2016). 
Ramakrishna, K. (2017). The threat of terrorism and extremism: "A Matter of 'When', and Not 'If' ". 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 335-350. 
Remuss, N. (2010). Creating a European internal security strategy involving space applications. 
Space Policy, 26(1), 9-14. doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.11.011 
RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police). (2011). Definition of radicalization. Retrieved from 
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/rad/internet/p2-eng.htm 
RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police). (2018). Definition of radicalization. Retrieved from 
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/gazette/the-foreign-fighter-challenge. 
Sageman, Marc. (2013).The Stagnation of Research on Terrorism, Chron. Higher Education. 
Retrieved from http://chronicle.com/blogs/conversation/2013/04/30/the-stagnation-of-
researchon-terrorism 
Sageman, M. (2008). “A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 223 (2008): 1–8, Retrieved from 
http://www.artisresearch.com/articles/Sageman_Strategy_for_Fighting.pdf. 
Schanzer, D., Kurzman, C., & Moosa, E. (2010). Anti-terror lessons of Muslim Americans. National 
Institute of Justice. 
Shahzad, F. (2014). The Discourse of Fear:  Effects of the War on Terror on Canadian University 
Students. American Review of Canadian Studies, 44, 467-482. 
 
 
59 
 
Shepard, M. (2016). What to do about the next Aaron Driver. Retrieved from 
https://www.thestar.com/news/atkinsonseries/generation911/2016/08/21/what-to-
doabout-the-next-aaron-driver.html 
Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2000). Identity theory and social identity theory. Social Psychology 
Quarterly, 63(3), 224-237. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (Eds.). (1986).The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. Chicago: 
Nelson-Hall. 
Toronto Sun, (2017). Retrieved from http://www.torontosun.com/2017/06/28/ottawa-battens-
down-for-canada-day-as-isis-threats-again 
The White House. (2011). Empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United 
States. Retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf. 
United Nations (2016). In Fight against Terrorism, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2322 (2016), 
Aiming to Strengthen International Judicial Cooperation. Retrieved from 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12620. 
Upal, A. (2015). Alternative narratives for preventing the radicalization of Muslim youth. Journal for 
De-radicalization. Spring (2), 138-162 
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Congress. (2012). 
Zachary Chesser: A case study on online Islamist radicalization and its meaning for the threat 
of homegrown terrorism. Retrieved from 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHESSER%20FINAL%20REPORT(1).pdf 
 
 
60 
 
Veenkamp, I., & Zeiger, S. (2015). Countering violent extremism: Program and policy approaches 
relating to youth through education, families, and communities. In M. Lombardi et al. (Eds.) 
Countering radicalization and violent extremism among youth to prevent terrorism. (pp. 
151-163). Washington, DC: IOS Press 
Vidino, L. (2010). Countering Radicalization in the America. Lessons from Europe (Special Report 
262 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010). Retrieved from 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR262%20-
20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf. 
Wade, J. (2015). Canada needs a stronger de-radicalization program. Retrieved from 
http://thesentinel.ca/canada-needs-a-stronger-deradicalization-program. 
Weine, S. (2012) Building resilience to violent extremism in Muslim diaspora communities in the 
United States, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 5:1, 60-73, 
doi:10.1080/17467586.2012.699085 
Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). Radical Islam Rising: Muslim extremism in the West. Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, [2005]. Retrieved from 
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00744a&AN=ufv.583591&site
=eds-live. 
Wittendorp, S. (2016). Unpacking ‘International Terrorism’: Discourse, the European Community 
and Counter-Terrorism, 1975-86. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54, 1233-1249. 
Williams, M. (2016). Youth, peace, and security: a new agenda for the Middle East and North Africa. 
Journal of International Affairs, 69(2), 103-112. 
Wolfberg, W. (2012). “The Homegrown Jihad: A Comparative Study of Youth Radicalization in the 
United States and Europe”. Retrieved from http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4421. 
 
 
61 
 
Wormeli, P. (2014). Developing Policies for Countering Terrorism. Criminology & Public Policy, 
13(3), 493-497. doi:10.1111/1745-9133.12098 
Ziemke, C. (2006).  “Perceived Oppression and Relative Deprivation: Social Factors Contributing to 
Terrorism,” in “In the Same Light as Slavery:” Building a Global Anti-terrorism Consensus, ed. 
Joseph McMillian, 97–127 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006). 
Retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/global_at_consensus.pdf. 
 
